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GNOSTIC DETERMINISM RECONSIDERED

BY

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Dedicated to Prof. M. Hengel
on the occasion of his 65th birthday

In this article[1] we want to focus our attention on the hereseological cliché of Gnostic determinism as it appears in the earliest hereseologists. For this purpose a short outline of the history of this cliché shall be given, as it can be observed in Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Origen. After that some more general conclusions shall be drawn from our observations.

Although we do not address ourselves to the extremely complicated question whether the charge of Gnostic determinism is a just description of the theological attitude of one particular Gnostic source or another, we assume that recent research on this question justifies our rather sceptical methodological approach: Before we can assess the justice of the charge of Gnostic determinism we must become aware of the hereseological attitude that generated the charge.[2]

1. Irenaeus of Lyon

The allegation that some heretics considered a certain class of people as 'saved by nature' makes its first definite appearance in Irenaeus, *haer.* Irenaeus is relating the doctrines of the Valentinian school; he is interrupting his account by some polemical remarks, when he says (*haer.* I,6,2): "They declare that it is not because of their works but rather because they are spiritual by nature (naturaliter spiritales/τὸ φύσει πνευματικοὺς εἶναι) that they are absolutely and in every way saved."[3]

And — in good polemical fashion — Irenaeus then goes on to describe the dire consequences of this particular doctrine for the moral conduct of the heretics.

In *haer.* II,29,1-3 Irenaeus' critique of gnostic determinism becomes both more interesting and more specific by exhibiting a peculiar blend

of theological and philosophical arguments. There Irenaeus tries to refute the Valentinian view of the different fate of the pneumatic, psychic and hylic substances/elements. He remarks that there is an inner contradiction in Valentinian eschatology: On the one hand this eschatology works according to the naturalistic principle 'similar to similar';[4] that is to say, in the end the three substances attain a position that is predetermined by their respective natures. On the other hand the 'ψυχικοί' attain their (intermediary) position if they are 'just', i.e. if they have faith and have performed good works. Irenaeus now argues that if the 'ψυχικοί' attained their final position because of the very substance of their souls, both the faith of the believer and the descent of the Saviour would be completely superfluous.[5]

Now this last argument seems to be the Christian version of a well known philosophical argument. For example already the sceptical Platonic Academy refuted with the same argument (the so called 'ἀργὸς λόγος'/the 'lazy argument') the determinism of the Stoics.[6] Thus Irenaeus' Christian transposition of an anti-stoic argument suggests that he viewed the Valentinian teaching on the different natures as in some important way akin to (Stoic) determinism. However, Irenaeus does not draw a direct and explicit parallel between the Stoic 'εἱμαρμένη' and Valentinian determinism. In *haer.* II,14,4 he rather claims a Stoic descent for Valentinian eschatology because it works according to the principle 'similar to similar'.[7]

But Irenaeus' critique does not stop there. Rather he goes on to assert (*haer.* II,29,2) that if the just 'ψυχικοί' are saved, their bodies must have a share in this salvation, since they participated in the good works the 'ψυχικοί' performed. In this way Irenaeus proves that the Valentinians are contradicting themselves, if they deny the resurrection of the dead and the 'salus carnis', the salvation of the flesh.[8]

Finally Irenaeus clinches his ingenious critique of Valentinian eschatology by taking sides in a topical philosophical controversy: Does the soul have different faculties (in the 2nd century this position was ascribed to Aristotle[9] or the Stoics[10]) or different parts (the Platonic doctrine)? Irenaeus opts in favour of the former solution: The mind is not something substantially different from the soul but rather a movement and an operation *of* the soul. Thus according to Irenaeus the Valentinians are wrong, when they claim that in the end the highest part of the soul alone reaches the Pleroma.

In a third passage, when he is discussing the problem of human liberty

in *haer.* IV,37,2 Irenaeus writes: "If, on the other hand, some are by nature good and others are by nature bad, then neither the former ones are worthy of praise on account of their goodness, since they were created like this; nor the latter ones are worthy of blame, since they, too, were created like this."[11] Here we see, how Irenaeus employs another philosophical argument against Stoic determinism: If people are completely determined in what they do, they cannot be praised or blamed; i.e. they are not responsible for their actions from a moral point of view. And Irenaeus then goes on to prove by the Scripture that we are free and responsible in our moral choices and even in the very act of faith.[12] This argument goes back at least as far as Aristotle; it was probably used by the Sceptic Academy against the Stoics; it was widely used in the 2nd century by philosophers as, for example, Alkinoos or Alexander of Aphrodisias or theologians like Justin Martyr.[13]

To sum up: Irenaeus denounces the naturalistic imagery of Valentinian eschatology as Stoicism in disguise. In developing this hereseological cliché Irenaeus maintains that the Valentinians also fall prey to a kind of determinism that denies both the 'oikonomia' of God and the moral responsibility of human beings. But although the bishop of Lyon refutes determinism with anti-Stoic arguments, he nowhere directly compares Valentinian determinism with Stoic determinism.[14]

2. Clement of Alexandria and Origen

Clement of Alexandria had a first-hand knowledge of gnostic, especially Valentinian sources and he knew that the phrase 'saved by nature' (φύσει σωζόμενον) does refer first and foremost to the pneumatic element of the soul. But Clement had also knowledge of Irenaeus' work and at various points his hereseology seems to be indebted to the anti-gnostic polemics of the bishop of Lyon.[15]

In view of this fact it is remarkable to observe how Clement uses Irenaeus' hereseological picture of Valentinian determinism in order to put the original fragments of Valentinus, Basilides and his son and pupil Isidorus into hereseological perspective. For example, in interpreting and criticizing the fragments of Basilides and Isidorus, Clement never tires to discover the ghost of 'gnostic determinism' under the most innocent guises.[16]

Now, in the first passage in the Stromata (*Str.* II,10,1ff), where he argues explicitly against 'gnostic determinism' Clement employs

precisely those two arguments that Irenaeus already had put forward: On the one hand the determinism of Basilides and Valentinus destroys the moral responsibility of the believer; thus it denies the genuine difference between belief and unbelief.[17] On the other hand it renders superfluous the salvific activity of God and his Son, the Lord Jesus Christ.[18]

But Clement develops these points in a particular way: For him, the gnostic determinism of both Basilides and Valentinus threatens the whole pedagogic 'οἰκονομία' of God. It reduces human beings to puppets on a string;[19] it pictures God as a mechanism of distribution, which determines beforehand the good or bad nature of every human being.

Clement describes the Gnostic determinism of Valentinus, Basilides and Isidorus in Stoic terminology;[20] but he does not make explicit the alleged connection between Stoicism and heresy.[21]

Furthermore, it is interesting to observe how Clement tries to exorcize the spectre of gnostic determinism by philosophical arguments drawn from a variety of sources: On the one hand he uses the Aristotelian and Stoic concept of 'προαίρεσις' to stress the essential freedom and moral responsibility of the believer.[22] On the other hand he employs the Stoic concept of 'συγκατάθεσις' to fight off determinism (*Str.* V,3,3).[23] It is the soul's faculty of assent that guarantees its freedom and moral responsibility. Thus the faculty of assent is, for example, a decisive factor in the spiritual struggle against demonic temptations (*Str.* II,111,3-4); it makes human beings in the highest sense human.

By taking up the Stoic term 'συγκατάθεσις', Clement brings into play another facet of the ancient philosophical debate about determinism: Chrysippus had defended the Stoic position against its Academic critics by distinguishing between internal and external, primary and secondary antecedent causes: The primary cause is always to be located inside man; it is precisely the soul's faculty of assent.[24]

To be sure, Clement's employment of the Stoic term 'συγκατάθεσις' against Basilides and Valentinus was not a particularly strong and helpful argument. On the one hand — as Clement himself indicates — Basilides had also used precisely this term for his definition of faith (πίστις): According to Basilides faith is an assent (συγκατάθεσις) to things not perceived by the senses.[25] On the other hand — and still more important — Clement's stress on the soul's faculty of assent was of no avail against a position that tried to argue with the *nature* of a person. One could have easily refuted Clement's critique by pointing out that the nature (φύσις) of a person is not something essentially different from his

faculty of rational assent; it is precisely this faculty of assent in which the nature of a rational person is perfected.

Origen seems to take up the problem of Gnostic determinism at precisely that point where Clement had left it. Whereas Clement had made an amalgam of Basilides and the Valentinian position by asserting that both claimed that some are saved by nature, Origen adds the third great heretic of the 2nd century, Marcion. Time and again you can find in Origen's writings the trio of Valentinus, Basilides and Marcion.[26] And Origen ascribes explicitly Gnostic determinism to Marcion as well.[27]

In 'De Principiis', Origen also takes up and develops Clement's suggestion that the freedom and the responsibility of human beings can be defended by stressing the soul's faculty of moral choice or assent.[28] Origen maintains that we are of course subject to external temptations, but that nevertheless we can resist them if we have received an appropiate training.[29] Origen defends this position against two further extreme positions: One claims that we are only free if we are subject to no external influences at all, the other one puts the whole blame on the inborn character of a human being. Against the latter position Origen argues that it is contrary to experience: Pedagogical admonishments can effect a change of character.[30]

But — as it is well known — Origen does not leave the problem there. Like Clement he assumes that according to the heretics God created human beings with different natures. In order to counter this claim, Origen speculates about the possibility that the souls themselves are responsible for the differences in their present condition. These differences are not due to different natures, but they are accounted for by different moral choices in their previous existence.[31]

Conclusion

Our observations suggest that the cliché of Gnostic determinism is part of a distinct hereseological tradition that was inaugurated/created by Irenaeus, developed by Clement and perfected by Origen. We know that Clement read Irenaeus; Alain le Boulluec has suggested that Origen was influenced by Irenaeus;[32] Origen knew Clement as well.[33]

In this context, it is interesting to remark that the philosopher Plotinus does not refer to any sort of 'gnostic determinism', when he is criticizing his Gnostic opponents.[34]

Furthermore, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus' important predecessor as hereseologist,[35] probably ignored the precise charge of Gnostic determinism. But also Hippolytus of Rome, who knew and plagiarized Irenaeus' work, does not seem to have paid too much attention to this particular hereseological cliché.[36]

Originally, Irenaeus applied the charge of Gnostic determinism only to the Valentinian model of Salvation history. The bishop's radical critique questioned the whole framework of Valentinian eschatology.

Whereas the Valentinians tried to describe the moral events of Salvation history at least partly in naturalistic categories, Irenaeus posited a sharp contradiction between physical and moral categories.[37] Furthermore Irenaeus insisted that Salvation history has a higher goal than the final return of primary substances to their original positions. Rather, Salvation history means the continuing creative activity of God that in the end renders the corruptible flesh incorruptible.

But this is now precisely the point where we have to be very careful: The Valentinians could have well agreed with Irenaeus that 'Salvation history' is a process of continued creation; and that there is more in the end than in the beginning: The pneumatic element is formed and educated; 'ψυχικοί' who are good receive the pneumatic element.[38]

Clement of Alexandria and Origen developed the precise anti-Valentinian critique of their illustrious predecessor into an hereseological cliché; in doing this they were working out hints given by Irenaeus himself. But the two Alexandrian theologians subtly shifted the theological accent and focussed their attention on the divine pedagogy of the soul rather than on the salvation of the flesh. They maintained that all souls/rational creatures are equally of the same substance.

Thus they could defend both the morality and humanity of human beings and the saving and loving and just pedagogical care of God for his creatures. Their hereseological position lead them to adopt a synergistic stance — but it is a very sophisticated synergism that deserves serious attention even from those theological quarters that would normally feel more at home with Augustine's views.

If we are right with these observations and conclusions we can now also formulate more precisely the question underlying the early hereseologist's charge of 'Gnostic determinism': What is the precise meaning and impact of the naturalistic language used by the (for example) Valentinians in describing their version of 'Salvation history'? And

behind this question, another, still deeper problem can be discerned: How can you describe the drama of Salvation history without implying any kind of determinism by the very language you use?

Notes

[1] An earlier version of this article was read as a communication at the 11th Patristic Conference in Oxford (August 1991). I extend my thanks to those members of the Conference who discussed the paper with me, especially to Dr. A. van den Hoek (Harvard University).

[2] For earlier treatments of this and related subjects, cf., for example, H. Langerbeck, *Aufsätze zur Gnosis* (ed. H. Dörries), Göttingen 1967, 38-82, esp. 63ff; L. Schottroff, Animae naturaliter salvandae. Zum Problem der himmlischen Herkunft des Gnostikers, in: Walther Eltester (ed.), *Christentum und Gnosis* (BZNW 37), Berlin 1969, 65-97; esp. 67-68; 83ff; 96-97; B. Aland, Erwählungstheologie und Menschenklassenlehre. Die Theologie des Herakleon als Schlüssel zum Verständnis der christlichen Gnosis?, in: *Gnosis and Gnosticism, papers read at the seventh international conference on patristic studies* (NHS 8), Leiden 1977, 148-184; Eadem, Gnosis und Kirchenväter. Ihre Auseinandersetzung um die Interpretation des Evangeliums, in: *Gnosis (FS Hans Jonas)*, Göttingen 1978, 158-215; A. Dihle, Das Problem der Entscheidungsfreiheit in frühchristlicher Zeit. Die Überwindung des gnostischen Heilsdeterminismus mit den Mitteln der griechischen Philosophie, in: *Gnadenwahl und Entscheidungsfreiheit in der Theologie der Alten Kirche* (ed. F. von Lilienfeld/E. Mühlenberg) (Oikonomia 9), Erlangen, 1980, 9-31; 90-94; Idem, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1982, 99ff; 150-157.

[3] Irenaeus of Lyon, *haer.* I,6,2 (Rousseau-Doutreleau [SC 264] 92-95).

[4] Cf. C.W. Müller, *Gleiches zu Gleichem. Ein Prinzip frühgriechischen Denkens* (Klassisch-Philologische Studien 31), Wiesbaden 1965, esp. 167-174.

[5] Irenaeus of Lyon, *haer.* II,29,1 (Rousseau-Doutreleau (SC 294) 296-297).

[6] The Stoics adapted the argument for their own purposes. Cf. Origen, Cels. II,20 (Chadwick 86, n. 2); (Ps.)-Plutarch, *De fato* 11/574E; Cicero, *De fato* XII (28f); *SVF* II, 956f (v. Arnim 277f). Cf. also D. Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque*, Amsterdam 1973², 212-223.

[7] Rousseau-Doutreleau (SC 294), 136-137: Irenaeus ascribes the principle 'similar to similar' to the Stoics and 'universi quotquot Deum ignorant poetae et conscriptores' (cf. C. W. Müller, *op. cit.)*

[8] Rousseau-Doutreleau (SC 294) 296f.

[9] Cf. Tertullian, *De anima* XIV, 3; cf. also the commentary of Waszink ad locum.

[10] I.e. Posidonius, cf. Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 476, 2-6; 501 (Mueller); cf. I.G. Kidd, Posidonius on Emotions, in: *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A.A. Long), London 1971, 200ff.

[11] Rousseau (SC 100) 922f.

[12] Cf. Irenaeus of Lyon, *haer.* IV, 37,2-6 (Rousseau [SC 100] 924ff). Cf. also E.P. Meijering, Irenaeus' Relation to Philosophy in the Light of his Concept of Free Will, in: Idem, *God being history* — Studies in Patristic Philosophy, Amsterdam-Oxford-New York 1977, 19-30. Meijering focusses his attention on Irenaeus' notion of God's free will.

[13] Cf. Cicero, *De fato* XVII (40); Alkinoos (Albinus), *Did.* XXVI,1 (Hermann

179,5ff/Whittaker-Louis 51): Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *De fato* 34 (Bruns 205,9ff); Justin Martyr, *1 apol.* 43,2, cf. C. Andresen, Justin und der mittlere Platonismus, *ZNW* 44 (1952/53), 194; Athenagoras, leg. 24,3 (Marcovich 80); cf. also Aristoteles, *EN* III,5/1113b ff.

[14] Perhaps Irenaeus' attitude can be compared with Justin Martyr, Alkinoos (Albinus) (cf. preceding note), Apuleius, *De Plat.* I,12, who attack the Stoic doctrine of 'εἱμαρμένη' anonymously, cf. the remark of C. Andresen (*op. cit.*, 184). Moreover, Middle-Platonic discussions of the problem of fate and free will were profoundly influenced by Stoic arguments and Stoic terminology, cf., for example, De Lacy-Einarson in their introduction to Pseudo-Plutarch's *De Fato*, LCL 405, 303ff; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, London 1977, 84ff (Antiochus of Ascalon); 320ff (Pseudo-Plutarch, Apuleius).

[15] Cf. A. Le Boulluec, *La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque IIe-IIIe siècles, t. II: Clément d'Alexandrie et Origène*, Paris 1985, 409f. A. Le Boulluec points out that Clement's critique of gnostic exegesis in *Str.* VII,94f is influenced by Irenaeus. — Another example of this influence can be observed in *Str.* III,1,1ff: There Clement tries to describe the Valentinian and Basilidean teaching concerning marriage and sexuality; he evidently lacks an apt quotation from the original writings of Valentinus. Therefore he cites the Valentinian syzygies as indicative of the Valentinians' positive attitude vis à vis marriage (*Str.* III,1,1, cf. Irenaeus of Lyon, *haer.* I,6,4). He goes on by quoting a passage from the 'Ethica' of Isidorus which he seems to consider as quite acceptable from his point of view (*Str.* III,1,1-3,2). After that he remarks that he quoted Isidorus in order to refute the libertinist Basilideans by the voices of their own forefathers. According to Clement the Basilideans are libertinists because they maintain the doctrine of gnostic determinism (*Str.* III,3,3). Now this last remark seems to be an hereseological cliché: Clement knew that Irenaeus considered gnostic determinism as the ideological root of libertinism; moreover he was well aware that according to Irenaeus the Basilideans were libertinists, cf. Irenaeus, *haer.* I,28,2. Thus Clement tried to strike a balance between his first hand information about Basilides and Isidorus and the second-hand hereseological cliché bequeathed to him by his predecessor.

[16] In order to validitate this claim fully, we would have to analyse the fragments of Basilides and Isidorus in great detail. Here suffice it to point out that Clement seems to be unable to cite an *original* fragment of Valentinus, Basilides or Isidorus in which the phrase 'φύσει σωζόμενον' is actually used. Clement is probably correct in ascribing the phrase to the Valentinians, cf. *Str.* II,10,2/exc. Thdot. 56,2-3 (cf. J. McCue, in: *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism I* [ed. B. Layton], Leiden 1980, 404ff). In the other relevant passages the very wording of Clement seems to indicate that he is using the phrase as an hereseological cliché to put the original fragments into perspective, cf. *Str.* II,115,1: III,3,3; IV,89,4; V,3,3; V,3,4. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe how Clement tries to denounce Basilides' view on theodicy and martyrdom as 'deterministic' (cf. A. Le Boulluec *op. cit.*, 307-308), although the text of Basilides' fragment does not compel such an interpretation, cf. *Str.* IV,81,1-88,5. A similar strategy can be observed in Clement's handling of Isidorus' views on psychology/anthropology, cf. *Str.* II,110,4-113,3. — Cf. also C. Markschies, *Valentinus Gnosticus? — Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins,* Diss. theol. Tübingen 1990, passim.

[17] Cf. *Str.* II,11,1 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 118,21ff).

[18] Cf. *Str.* II, 11,2 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 118,31-119,3). Cf. also D. Amand, *op. cit.*, 258-274, esp. 272f.

[19] For this methaphor, cf. Marcus Antoninus 2,1,4; 3,16,2; 6,16,1; 6,28; 7,3,1 (Theiler); Porphyrius, apud Stobaeus 2,8,40 (Wachsmuth II 167).

[20] Cf. especially Clement of Alexandria, *Str.* II,11,1 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 118,27-30).

[21] This agrees with A. Le Boulluec's observation that Clement — unlike Irenaeus — does not consider the heretics as directly influenced by Greek philosophy, cf. A. Le Boulluec, *op. cit.*, 272f; 288ff. Moreover, it is important to observe that Clement is remarkably reticent about Stoic determinism. He rather stresses that both Platonists and Stoics describe the faculty of assent (συγκατάθεσις) as 'ἐφ' ἡμῖν', cf. *Str.* II,54,5 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 142,25-26). Cf. also our remarks above (note 14).

[22] Cf. *Str.* II,11,1; cf. Aristotle, *EN* 1094A; 1113A 10; *SVF* IV (M. Adler), s.v.

[23] But cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Str.* II,54,5 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 142,25f) which could imply that the concept of 'συγκατάθεσις' was also used by contemporary Platonists. Cf. Numenius, Fr. 45 (Des Places 91-92).

[24] Cf. *SVF* II 974 (v. Arnim 282f) = Cicero, *de fato* XVIIf (39f).

[25] Cf. *Str.* II,27,2 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 127,19-21).

[26] Cf. A. v. Harnack, *Der kirchengeschichtliche Ertrag der exegetischen Arbeiten Origenes II* (TU 42,4), Leipzig 1919, 54-81.

[27] For a synopsis of passages where Origen mentions gnostic determinism, cf. A. Le Boulluec, *op. cit.*, 510-511 (n. 242; 243). For Marcion as propagator of Gnostic determinism, cf. Origen, *comm. in Rom.* IV,12 (PG 14 1002A); *princ.* II,9,5 (Görgemanns-Karpp 409). — Cf. also Origen, *Philocalie* 25; 27 (Junod [SC 226] 214f; 274f): Whereas in *Philocalie* 25 the doctrine of divine prescience gets an extensive treatment, *Philocalie* 27 deals with the hardening of Pharao's heart: On the one hand Origen attacks the Marcionites who considered the hardening of Pharao's heart as the work of the just demiurge; on the other hand he directs his polemics against the gnostic doctrine of different natures. Cf. also E. Junod's excellent introduction, SC 226, 72ff; 103ff.

[28] Cf. Origen, *princ.* III,1,4 (Görgemanns-Karpp 468,12ff). Cf. also Origen, *princ.* III,1,2 (Görgemanns-Karpp 464f); Origen, Jo. XIII, 10,64; Clement of Alexandria, *Str.* II,110,4f (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 173,17ff). Cf. also Ph. J. van der Eijk, Origenes' Verteidigung des freien Willens in De Oratione 6,1-2, *Vigiliae Christianae* 42 (1988), 339-351.

[29] Cf. *princ.* III,1,4 (Görgemanns-Karpp 470).

[30] Cf. *princ.* III,1,5 (Görgemanns-Karpp 472).

[31] Cf. *princ.* III,1,23 (Görgemanns-Karpp 554); *princ.* II,9,6 (Görgemanns-Karpp 412). But cf. the cautionary remarks of M. Harl, La préexistence des âmes dans l'œuvre d'Origène, in: *Origeniana Quarta*, Innsbruck-Wien 1987, 238-258.

[32] Cf. A. Le Boulluec, La place de la polémique antignostique d'Irénée dans le Peri Archon, in: *Origeniana* (Quaderni di Vetera Christianorum 12), Bari 1975, 47-61; idem, Y a-t-il des traces de la polémique antignostique d'Irénée dans le Peri archon d'Origène, in *Gnosis and Gnosticism*, ed. M. Krause (NHS 8), Leiden 1977, 138-147.

[33] Cf., for example, H. Chadwick in the Preface of his translation of Origen's *Cels.*, Cambridge 1965², IX.

[34] But cf. A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will ...*, 154 who seems to detect the charge of Gnosis determinism in Plotin. *En.*2,9,14 (unfortunately we were unable to examine Dihle's further reference to Simplicius, p. 70 Dübner, because Dübner's edition does not seem to be available in Bonn; Dihle also refers to Tertullian, *adv. Marcionem* 2,5-9 — but Tertullian knew Irenaeus.). Cf. also K. Alt, *Philosophie gegen Gnosis. Plotins Polemik in seiner*

Schrift II 9 (Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur/Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jg. 1990/Nr. 7), Mainz 1990, 48 (n. 148); 64 (n. 195).

[35] Cf. A. Le Boulluec, *La notion...*, 36-91.

[36] In this respect it is important to observe that the Valentinian section of Hippolytus' *Sondergut* does not subscribe to the type of eschatology known to us from the parallel version in Irenaeus (*haer.* I,7,1f): There is no eschatological scenario that describes the return of the pneumatic, psychic and hylic substances/elements to their different positions and, consequently, the key word 'φύσει σωζόμενον' does not appear, cf. Hippolytus of Rome *haer.* VI,36 (Marcovich 250-1).

[37] But cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Str.* III,63,4 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu II 225,12ff).

[38] Cf. Irenaeus, *haer.* I,7,5.

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